It is always difficult to suggest that what you do is unique, but I think it would be
somewhat fair to say that the views that I present in the IMRA are at least a bit unusual.
This represents my efforts, over many years, to come up with an explanation for what the
various capital markets are doing. Perhaps it would be best to start somewhere near the
beginning and work forward.
I became interested in the equity markets during the late 1970s while a
university student in Canada. Since I didnt have any capital to speak of, I formed
two different investment clubs and used those funds for my first real trading. My Honors
thesis dealt with geographical portfolio diversification and I was hired by a Canadian
investment dealer upon graduation. My love affair with investment had truly begun.
After getting beaten and battered from time to time by major trend changes, I finally
decided to stop relying on the reams of fundamental and technical research that were at my
disposal- and that was reliably wrong at major turning points- and get serious about
figuring things out for myself. In order to have any confidence, I needed to know what
made the markets really tick. After hundreds and hundreds of hours of studying charts,
printing them out, drawing lines, cutting and pasting different charts together, I finally
began to see some of the cycles and underlying trends that would form the basis for my
work. To a large extent I stopped reading the opinions of others in order to keep my own
views as pure as possible and in time developed many of my inter-market theories. To my
surprise years later, I found that there was an established, although somewhat basic, body
of work on intermarket relationships, but to this day I have never given it more than a
cursory glance.
I deal with the equity, fixed income, foreign exchange, and commodity markets. I try
and determine what the movement or changes in trend in one market may mean to the others.
There is no one overriding theme to what I do, nor is there any specific
purpose other than to forecast trend changes and explain current action. Perhaps that is
enough.
While there are many things that I pay strict attention to, there are others that I
largely ignore. I pay little heed to volume, for instance, which would make most technical
analysts shudder. I only recognize a small handful of technical chart patterns and work
only exclusively with channels. I have found that when I can discern the proper channel-
by which I mean two parallel lines that determine the top and bottom of a trend- I have
almost everything I need. Obviously the shorter your time frame, the less useful this form
of analysis might be.
Currency trends tend to run on for years and are extremely powerful in that they help
to explain the direction of the flow of liquidity. There are some currencies that I would
call naturally strong, since those countries run persistent current account surpluses, and
others that are naturally weak for the same but opposite reason. If a currency like the
U.S. dollar moves into an uptrend, then it is only because an inordinately large amount of
capital is moving toward the U.S. Why? Is it because their short-term interest rates are
being held artificially high or is it because of some fundamental reason to do with
growth? Is capital being pulled or is it being pushed? Is it because growth prospects are
rising in one area or diminishing in another? What would that mean to commodity prices?
What are the usual lags between major changes in interest rates and gold, oil, or the
agricultural complex? What currencies tend to move with or ahead of changes in certain
commodities? What effects do major trend changes in the bond market have on the equity
market and with what lag?
To me, fundamental research is limited in its usefulness because it is based on a set
of economic assumptions that are usually wrong. I find that it is far easier to forecast
the economy off of the financial markets than to make market predictions off of an
economic forecast. Since most analysts deal with a specific group of companies or a
specific industry, they must build their assumptions upon a foundation given to them by
their economists. While an economic cycle or trend continues, chances are the conclusions
will be valid, but at major turning points we end up with garbage in, garbage
out.
I also find that most technical analysis is interesting but limited as well. If one
were to draw a trend line and suggest that support or resistance has just been broken, I
would ask why? Beyond that, is there confirmation from other markets? If not,
why not? Is this a major turning point or simply a minor bump on a long-term chart that
will soon disappear? I am always looking for confirmations and divergences.
What do I believe in? I believe in Kondratieffs 50-55 year cycle. I believe that
market cycles repeat, but never in the same way. I believe that if you dont know
what you are looking for, chances are you wont find it. I believe that you must have
a thesis to trade successfully and that you must have a way of constantly checking to see
if your thesis is correct. I believe that there are consistent leads and lags between
markets. I believe in seasonality, quarterly trends, month end distortions, and the
consistency of human psychology. I believe that as trends mature they often get faster. I
believe that when a trend goes parabolic, it should be viewed through logarithmic charts.
I believe in trend lines and channels. I believe, above all else, that the markets are
always rational. If you think otherwise, you simply do not understand what is going on.
To get to the heart of the matter, I have selected six inter-market relationships that
tend to be relatively consistent over time and may help with your understanding of what
the markets are doing and why. There are many other relationships that I work with that
may be consistent through a cycle but will vary from one to the next. As an explanation, I
consider a market cycle to begin with the bottom in the bond and equity markets and
continue until both have bottomed once more. These generally last 2-4 years, with 3 years
being a reasonable average i.e. there were equity bear markets in 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990,
1994, and in many parts of the world, 1997.
Lets begin.
- Bonds and Commodities
Of all the relationships, this has to be one of my favorites, since it operates on two
distinct levels. In real time, rising commodity prices tend to push bond prices lower,
while falling commodity prices lead to higher bond prices. In other words, there is a
distinct inverse relationship- most of the time. On the other hand, there is also a lagged
relationship that is rarely noticed, but is equally powerful. Commodity price trends
follow major bond market turning points by about two years.


Why? Actually, I have no idea why the lead/lag relationship is so consistent, but it
still makes perfect sense that there should be one. Put another way, why do changes in
overnight interest rates affect the capital markets? The answer, of course, is that like a
pebble splashing into a body of calm water, the ripples spread out over time through the
conduit of the financial system and into the real world. While central bankers admit that
it often takes 12-18 months for monetary policy changes to impact the economy, we simply
suggest that major changes in the direction of longer term interest rates- either up or
down- affect commodity prices as a whole two years later.
I have included charts of the U.S. 30-year T-Bond futures and the Dow Jones AIG Futures
Index, and shifted them so that the lead/lag relationship can be seen more clearly. What
you are looking at, then, are the broad movements of longer-term interest rates (with
falling bond prices equating to rising rates) and commodity prices. Viewed in this way it
is possible to see quite clearly how major peaks in the bond market (lows for interest
rates) are followed about two years later by cyclical peaks in commodity prices.
Keep in mind that this is a trend within a trend. At present we are still dealing with
a deflationary cycle. On the other hand, simply knowing whether the general trend within
that cycle is toward rising or falling commodity prices is a significant benefit. With
that knowledge you can adjust your trading strategy from selling the rallies to buying the
dips. The surprises should all be to the upside through the year 2000.
2. The Bond/Stock 6-Month Lag
Have you ever wondered why so many people argue that timing the stock market is
impossible? It isnt, but it also isnt easy. It is my view that this is
actually more an art than a science, which makes it very difficult for people on Wall
Street. If you realize that there is a tremendous need to black box the
market- to quantify or model it- you can get an appreciation for why so many view the
movements as seemingly random. Lets start with this: Each equity market cycle is
both broadly similar and exceptionally unique. There are repeating patterns, but they
occur in a different enough way that spotting them takes more than a bit of thought.
I would also suggest that the buy for the long-term message that we have
all been bombarded with over the past decade or so was created and perpetuated by the
mutual fund industry, which earns a percentage on the assets under management and thus has
a vested interest in having individuals ride out the declines.

In recent Humphrey-Hawkins testimony, Mr. Greenspan suggested that there was no way of
knowing if there was a bubble in the financial markets until it could be
examined with the benefit of hindsight. While it is certainly not the prime function of
the Federal Reserve to keep prices and underlying values close together, this comment
exemplified the views of many- and was wholly incorrect. In cycle after cycle, the
bubble is created when the equity markets rise after the bond market turns
down. The longer this process continues the greater the resultant risk. The higher the
equity markets move in the interim, the larger the eventual market decline. If left
unchecked, it has the power to destabilize the entire financial system.
To show what I mean, I have included a comparative chart of the U.S. T-Bond futures and
the S&P 500 Index futures for the 1987-90 period. I could have used the Dow Jones
Industrial Index or the S&P 500 Index itself just as easily.
During a deflationary cycle, all declines in the equity markets are buying
opportunities UNTIL the bond market peaks and turns down. The equity markets tend to
accelerate higher at that point, and usually provide the best gains of the entire cycle
over the next six months. The real risk begins to build 5-7 months after the bond market
peak.
I dont, by the way, just use the bond market for this analysis. I cross-reference
the bond market peak with various other markets to determine the exact starting point. I
also use the utility indices (both the Dow Jones Utility Index and Philadelphia Utility
Index) for confirmation. However, in a general sense the crucial message here is that once
bond prices begin to fall in earnest, the equity markets tend to rise briskly to a top and
then correct lower.
How is this useful?

Consider the equity market action through into 1998. Bond prices had been rising and
from the point of view of certain inter-market analyses, perhaps should have peaked in
early 1998. As the pressure began to build on the currencies of several SE Asian countries
(Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and The Philippines) liquidity flows pushed
bond prices to new highs. When the equity markets buckled, we knew that this was simply a
buying opportunity- no matter how dire the outlook appeared at that time.
3. Bonds and Equities Bottom Together

On a day-to-day basis, it almost seems impossible for the equity and bond markets to
bottom together. Generally one would read that the bond market gets a flight to
quality boost any time the equity markets get into serious trouble, creating the
impression that these two work in opposite directions. Not true.
Using the T-Bond futures and the S&P 500 Index once again, we showcase the 1981-85
time period to make this point.
When examining the comparative chart, it is obvious that the bond and equity markets
bottomed together in 1984, but not in 1981. We used this time period specifically to point
out just how powerful this relationship is. The equity markets did bottom in late 1981-
even though prices went lower into the late summer of the next year. The tremendously
powerful surge in the equity market at that time brought prices back to the rising channel
that began when bond prices bottomed. In other words, something more powerful than
inter-market forces acted on the equity markets for almost one year (a serious economic
recession), but once that passed, the relationships reasserted themselves.

In the current market, the sharp increase in bond prices from the beginning of
2000 is a clear divergence. The fundamental justifications i.e. a reduction of future
supply and a substantial asset allocation shift away from equities, can not alter the fact
that in due course bond prices will test if not exceed the lows. To truly end the cycle,
bond prices will have to wash out with equity prices.
4. Crude Oil and Bonds

One of the more fascinating inter-market relationships exists between the energy
complex and interest rates. Since this relationship exists on two different levels, it
often appears quite confusing. On a longer-term basis, rising energy prices put upward
pressure on interest rates and vice versa.
The comparative chart of the U.S. 10-year T-Note futures and crude oil futures
highlights just how powerful the relationship is between these two markets- even in a
technology-driven world. The peak in interest rates (bottom in bond prices) globally tends
to occur when crude oil, heating oil, and unleaded gasoline futures peak for the cycle.
Typically this process takes about 15 months.
In the short-term, however, there is more here than meets the eye. It may be common
knowledge that rising energy prices affect interest rates, even in the absence of any
discernible change in the overall inflation rate, but what is generally not known is which
market drives the other. Intuitively we would think that rising energy prices are causing
bond prices to fall, but in the short-term it is actually the other way around.
In the shorter-term chart of crude oil futures and T-Note futures shown below, it
becomes clear that oil prices will continue to work higher until bond prices make new
lows. In other words, as long as bond prices are trading above the recent lows, energy
prices will keep working higher. This process will continue through the entire cycle until
bond prices finally move low enough to impact both the financial markets and the economy,
at which point oil prices will collapse- marking the peak in interest rates.
In summary, then, we see that rising energy prices drive interest rates higher in the
medium to long term, but that relatively firm bond prices tend to push crude oil prices
higher in the short-term.

5. Commodity Prices, The Dollar, and Emerging Market Equity Valuations

Even in this new age of e-commerce and technological revolution, commodity prices still
matter. Many regions of the world are extremely sensitive to the pricing of basic raw
material prices, although we tend to overlook the fact that from an external point of
view, the U.S. dollar is also a major factor. I have found that the multiplying the U.S.
Dollar Index by a broad index of commodity prices is a helpful tool in assessing the
overall trend of some of the smaller equity markets. Above we show this product compared
Argentinas Buenos Aires SE Bolsa Index.
6. Commodity Prices and Sector Selection

Shown above is a comparative chart of the CRB Index futures and the price spread
between the U.S.s Dow Jones Industrial Index and Canadas TSE 300 Index. As
Canada has a much greater reliance upon commodity prices, it makes intuitive sense that
its equity markets would tend to outperform once commodity prices turn higher, and vice
versa.
7. Technology and Commodity Prices

Most people involved with the financial markets, in my opinion, tend to miss the bigger
picture. The trend in commodity prices, for instance, affects interest rates, currencies,
foreign equity markets, and commodity sensitive industries. It also has a rather marked
impact on certain sectors that ordinarily wouldnt be associated with raw material
price trends. To show what we mean, we have included a comparative chart that contrasts
the movement of the CRB Index futures with the price ratio between the Nasdaq Composite
Index and the CBOE Internet Index (Isdex). When this ratio is falling, it means that
Internet oriented companies are performing better than the Nasdaq index as a whole.